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1970]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

surance policy procured by the defendant, and the court permitted the
defendant to plead his insurer's payments in reduction of damages.
This exception to the third-party beneficiary argument was
recently extended by Grynbal v. Grynbal,83 In that case the plaintiff,
a passenger in the defendant's car, was injured in an accident with a
joint tortfeasor. The defendant, relying upon Moore, claimed an offset
for his insurer's medical payments to the plaintiff.
However, in a cross-motion, the joint tortfeasor claimed an offset
for these same payments. The court allowed the joint tortfeasor to
offset the damages but stated that in the event the plaintiff prevails,
contribution of one-half of these medical payments would have to be
made to the co-defendant or his insurance carrier in accordance with
CPLR 1401.84 Furthermore, the court held that, in the event that the
plaintiff does not recover from the defendant, the joint tortfeasor's
offset of medical payments would be disallowed.
The offset allowance to the joint tortfeasor is an important
extension of the Moore rationale since, as between the plaintiff and the
joint tortfeasor, the medical payments are nongratuitous, and hence
collateral, benefits. It appears that the joint tortfeasor's right to the
offset is a derivative right since Salinsky suggests that the court should
disallow any offset when the co-defendant is removed from the litigation.
CPLR 3020: Verification of answer permitted by associate of attorney
of record.
In Teichman v. Ker, 5 the Supreme Court, Nassau County, confronted with an original question arising under CPLR 3020, interpreted the section in a practical manner. The court denied a motion
to treat verification of an answer by other than an attorney of record
or an attorney of counsel as a nullity. Rather, verification by an associate of the attorney of record was held to be sufficient compliance
with the section.
The court noted that the New York Advisory Committee had
suggested that "where a firm of attorneys desires the name of the firm
to the benefit of such foresight and to reduction on damages.
N.Y.S.2d at 767.

Id.at 891, 264

83 52 App. Div. 2d 427, 302 N.Y.S.2d 912 (2d Dep't 1969).

84 CPLR 1401 enables a defendant, who has paid more than his pro rata share, to
obtain contribution from the other defendants with respect to the excess paid over and
above his pro rata share.
8560 Misc. 2d 789, 302 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969).
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'
could be used followed by the attorney acting for it.
"6 Although this
procedure has not yet been adopted, Teichman seems to suggest that
verification in this manner would be permissible. However, a second
suggestion of the Advisory Committee, 7 which would permit attorneys
to merely certify, has not been adopted by the legislature, and the
courts lack the power to implement it. The purpose of this latter
technique would be to place greater emphasis upon the client's verac88
ity.
The Teichman court's holding will undoubtedly be welcomed
by the busy practitioner who is often out of town and unable to perform the mechanical function of signing a verification. The question
remains, however, whether this practice can be extended to affirmations
made pursuant to CPLR 2106. Since 2106 is intended to save an attorney time and trouble,8 9 it would seem that the courts might be inclined
to approve this procedure as well. However, since the sanction for
false swearing is conviction for perjury,90 the signature of an associate
should not suffice under such circumstances.

CPLR 3025(b): Leave to amend answer denied because plaintiff would
be prejudiced thereby.
Leave to amend pleadings shall be freely given. 9' However, a court
may, in its discretion, impinge upon this statutory latitude.92 In JamesSmith v. Rottenberg,93 an action for breach of a contract for the sale
of realty, the defendant's answer contained only a general denial.
However, two years later he moved to amend his answer so as to include the affirmative defenses of fraud and illegality. The appellate
division, reversing the trial court, denied the motion. The court found
that the bases of the affirmative defenses were known, or should have
been known, at the time the original complaint was served. 94
86 FixsT REP. 73-74.
87 Compare FINAL REP. A-426 with SLxcm REP. 43, 277-78.

88 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3020, supp. commentary 175, 176 (1969). For a severe
criticism of the verification process as it exists in New York see Professor Siegel's remarks.
Id. at 175-77.
89 2A WK&M 2106.01 (1969).
90 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 210A0 (McKinney 1967).
91 CPLR 3025(b).
92 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3025, supp. commentary 191, 193 (1969): "3025(b) intends
the 'widest possible discretion' to be lodged in the court .. "
93 32 App. Div. 2d 792, 302 N.Y.S.2d 355 (2d Dep't 1969).
94 See 3 WK&M 1 3025.15 (1969) wherein it is noted that:
[S]ome cases have held that leave will be denied if the moving party knew or
should have known of the facts or the cause of action sought to be added at the
time of the original pleading and cannot satisfactorily explain his failure to
plead them at that time.

